Relations and the Region: Four years past 2021
Afghanistan‑Pakistan relations, historically grounded in strong people‑to‑people ties, have been strained by the Afghan jihad, the rise of the Taliban, and persistent terrorism and militancy that threaten stability on both sides. Is this the time to change? Asks Ambassador (R) Mansoor Ahmad Khan
Afghanistan-Pakistan relations have been rooted in close bonds between the two peoples. However, Afghan Jihad and later emergence of the Taliban have changed the fabric of Afghan politics, Pakistan-Afghan border region and bilateral relations. Terrorism , militancy and violent extremism have become perpetual threats to peace and stability in both countries. The increasing geo-political polarization has been preventing the region to combat these threats and ensuing instability. The ultimate solution of these challenges lies in both Pakistan and Afghanistan to address basics of their relations and wok towards harnessing a conducive environment for people’s movements, trade and economic exchanges. The regional economic integration and connectivity can be instrumental in achieving durable stability, harmony and progress. Security and counter-terrorism cooperation is vital for these goals. But Afghanistan and Pakistan will also have to guard against their border region from once again becoming theatre of a new major power rivalry or war.
Background
15 August 2025, marking the fourth anniversary of the Taliban takeover and, consequent formation of the second rule of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), despite relative calm in the situation the larger picture of peace, stability and normalization of Afghanistan in the contemporary world order remains unclear and hazy. During this period, the Taliban’s Afghan Interim Government regime is fully in control of the ground situation and has consolidated its hold on the instruments of power in Afghanistan. While security threats continue to remain due to the presence of global and regional terrorist groups in some regions and pockets in the country, for the first time in past fifty years all parts of Afghanistan are accessible under a central authority and without any active armed insurgency or militancy.
Limited Afghan progress towards broadening engagement
A valid question that arises in this context is that despite
the Taliban significantly extending their dominance over Afghanistan in many
ways, why there is limited progress towards broadening of Afghanistan’s
engagement with the region and the world leading to their international
recognition. In this regard, most notably, the developments in the crucial
relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have defied all expectations,
calculations and assessments. To find plausible responses or explanations to
such questions and queries, it is important to dig deeper into key
inter-related factors not only underlying Afghanistan’s progression in the
current global and regional environment but also with the country’s most vital
relations with Pakistan. The most critical factors in this context are:
I. Impact of
Taliban Movement – Ideological and Political Dimensions;
II. Terrorism,
Militancy and Violent Extremism;
III. Peoples’
Exchanges, Economic Cooperation and Trade;
IV. Global
Geo-political Currents; and
V. Regional
Cooperation and Connectivity.
I. Impact of Taliban Movement – Ideological and Political Dimensions
The most significant factor for Afghanistan’s normalization
and mainstreaming in the global order under the Taliban 2.0 rule in Afghanistan
is the impact of the Taliban Movement in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region.
Since Jihadist movements took roots in Afghanistan and Pakistan in mid-1970s
with the support of the United States to contain the then increasing Soviet
influence in Afghanistan, the struggle between religionists and political
forces has been at the center stage of Afghan politics. Though the Afghan Jihad
against the Soviet occupation strengthened religion-based militancy in
Afghanistan and the region, the Afghan Jihadist parties of 1970s and 1980s were
supportive of democratic political and constitutional frameworks in
Afghanistan.
The emergence of the Taliban in 1994 as a Pashtun Sunni
Islamic armed group signifying a major shift in Afghanistan’s political scene
redefining concepts of politics, governance, security, constitutionalism,
culture, ethnic-relations, human rights, role of women in various activities
and many other areas. Within two years, a meltdown caused by infighting among
the Jihadi groups enabled the Taliban to form the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan rule from 1996-2001 under their first Emir Mullah Muhammad Umar. It,
however, became evident that the Taliban had no roadmap or understanding about
governing a state as large as Afghanistan except the religious education
received at the large network of Deobandi madrassahs in Afghanistan and
Pakistan established to forge Jihad against Soviet occupation forces.
The U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan removed the
Taliban from power but provided them two decades to muster their military
capabilities, strengthen community linkages and better organize through
skillful diplomatic engagement with the international community. Consequently,
the resurrection of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 2021 came without
much challenge from other Afghan or external actors.
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| Pakistan and Afghanistan have to take corresponding measures for realization of this historic opportunity of changing the direction of the regional politics (Picture: Chatly AI) |
The Taliban’s presence on Afghan scene for over three decades including their past four years’ rule with unhindered authority exposes some challenges for communities in Afghanistan and for the region and the world with regard to adjusting to the Taliban Movement’s ideological and political philosophy, its views about the statecraft and its interaction with other countries, groups and entities within the confines of the contemporary international order.
During the first Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996-2001), the Taliban did not work for evolving a Constitutional legal order laying down a framework for governance and politics in line with their religious philosophy. After assuming power again in 2021, a notable Taliban scholar and the Chief Justice of Afghanistan Sheikh Abd Al-Hakim al-Haqqani published a book in April 2022 titled al-Imara al-Islamiyya wa-nizamuha, (The Islamic Emirate and its System).
The book with a Preface by Taliban Emir Hibatullah
Akhundzada is described as the Mussawidah or the manual for forming and running
of the Islamic state in Afghanistan by the Taliban .
Apart from rigid religious interpretations arising from Deobandi school of thought particularly on issues of human rights and participation of women in different walks of life, this document defines the concept of statehood for Afghan state under the Taliban which is quite different from the concept of nation-states in the Westphalian system and the UN-based global order.
Under this concept the Emirate has to be led and run by the Taliban and no system is conceived for sharing power between the Taliban non-Taliban elements or coalition governments between the Taliban and other parties, groups or individuals. Assumption, therefore remains for continuation of exclusive Taliban regime in the country for an indefinite period. No other work explaining Sheikh Haqqani’s book or any additional interpretations on politics and governance structures by the Taliban have been brought in the public light.
This dimension is crucial in terms of impact on Afghan Taliban’s
relations with other Afghan political and ethnic communities as well as in the
context of Afghanistan’s relations with other countries including
Afghanistan-Pakistan relations .
While the Taliban maintain that the politics and governance
are internal matter of a country, these developments in Afghanistan have
consequences for other countries particularly the neighbours. During their
insurgency against the U.S. and NATO forces, the Afghan Taliban had shared
ideology and support linkages with the religious militant groups having agenda
for neighbouring countries, most notably, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) for China, Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) for the Central Asian countries. It is natural for these
groups to have ideological inspirations for emulating in their respective
countries what the Afghan Taliban have achieved in Afghanistan.
The most relevant case in point is of the TTP which remains
engaged in efforts for establishing a Shariah-based Taliban government in
Pakistan or parts of Pakistan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where the group has
significant influence . TTP’s militancy and terrorist incidents carried out by
the group in Pakistan have significantly increased since the Taliban takeover
in Afghanistan. Though Emir Hibatuulah Akhundzada has labelled cross-border
attacks by Afghan Taliban including those in Pakistan as ‘haram’ and
‘forbidden, the ideological linkage between the two Taliban movements remains
strong .
For Pakistan, the increasing trend of Talibanization infiltrating from across the border in Afghanistan is a major challenge also impinging upon bilateral relations. Many Pakistani analysts endorse such apprehensions. The TTP leadership has not only taken Bayt on Afghan Taliban Emir Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, but the key TTP commanders have also found refuge, shelter and support inside Afghanistan.
The TTP leadership is using the same tactics not only in military approach by targeting Pakistan’s strategic interests but also in luring local communities through appointing shadow governors etc. like those used by the Afghan Taliban in their insurgency against the U.S. and NATO forces.
The TTP’s demands from Pakistan regarding
weaponization, imposition of Shariah by the group in their areas and annulling
merger of FATA as part of KP make it difficult for Pakistan to politically
reconcile with the TTP within Pakistan’s constitutional framework.
Assessing the future direction of the Taliban rule in
Afghanistan, one possibility is that the Afghan Taliban’s rigid stance on these
issues may be a tactical position viz a viz the U.S. and major global powers to
secure international recognition of the Afghan Interim Government and its seat
in the UN and other international and regional organizations. And once there
are signs of progress in that direction, the Afghan Taliban may gradually take
measures to transform the governance and political system responding to the
aspirations of the people of Afghanistan which in turn may also be helpful in
developing harmonious partnerships with all neighbouring countries including
Pakistan and the rest of the world. Already some regional countries including
China, Russia, Pakistan, Uzbekistan and the UAE have established full
diplomatic relations with Afghanistan and are expanding engagement despite reservations
in many areas.
However, if the Afghan Taliban continue on the current track
following a rigid approach in political and governance domain, it is likely to
aggravate the process of Afghanistan’s mainstreaming into the international
relations and broadening of engagement with other countries of the world.
Unfortunately, such a scenario will prolong the suffering of the Afghan people
due to the prevailing sanctions on the Taliban and economic and banking
restrictions against the country.
II. Terrorism,
Militancy and Violent Extremism
Pakistan-Afghanistan border region has been the theatre of unending terrorism, militancy and violent extremism for past five decades. The 2,600 km long border inhabited by 50 million Pashtuns living on either side of the border linked through centuries-old tribal, religious and cultural bonds remained battleground of major armed power struggle through Afghan Jihad in 1980s against Soviet occupation, a bloody civil war in 1990s complicated by regional proxies and a Taliban insurgency against the presence of the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan from 2001-2021.
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The scale of Afghanistan’s terrorism and militancy problem
has been complex. In the final years of the Afghan Taliban insurgency between
2018 and 2021, the number of terrorists
and active militant fighters in Afghanistan had significantly increased to
around 100,000 – some 70,000 Afghan Taliban and around 15000 including TTP,
ETIM, IMU, ISKP and smaller outfits . Managing such a large terrorism/militancy
footprint became one of the most pressing challenges for the U.S. and NATO
forces with their declining strength and the lack of capacity and prevailing corruption
in the Afghan security forces and branches of administration under the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan led by then President Ashraf
Ghani . The cross-border support networks of some of these groups with the
elements in Pakistan further complicated the counter-terrorism and
counter-militancy campaigns in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Following key developments since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan have caused an increase in the terrorist activities especially in Pakistan:
- One, as the
Afghan provinces were falling to the Taliban one after another in July-August
2021, the Afghan state control was dissipating and a number of prisons were
broken during which thousands of fighters, militants and miscreants reportedly
fled from detention. The Taliban never acknowledged this act nor they gave any
explanations for these allegations. The reports and assessments of the security
experts, however, indicate that most of these militants were from either the
TTP or the ISKP and rejoined the fighting ranks following their release from
the prison .
- Two, during 2020-21 the U.S. had been seriously engaged in transportation of their armour and weaponry from Afghanistan prior to the completion of the withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO forces. However, a significant cache of weapons and security equipment could not be transported out of Afghanistan before completion of the U.S. withdrawal which came into the possession of the Afghan Taliban. Many reports claim that at least some part of these weapons made its way to the miscreants through connivance or black market . While the assertions about the exact quantum of such weaponry cannot be verified, this element continues to remain part of the debate about increase in the terrorist activity in Pakistan in recent years.
- Three, with the Taliban takeover, gap between perceptions and perspectives of the states of Pakistan and Afghanistan astonishingly widened particularly on issues relating to security and the dynamics of the bilateral relations. The respective expectations and narratives on the challenge of the TTP and the ways to deal with it were quite different. The Afghan Taliban advised that TTP fighters being Pakistanis living on Afghan soil, Pakistan has to enter into a dialogue with the TTP to address the issues amicably. But when Pakistan’s security officials held two rounds of parleys with the TTP commanders in Kabul between April and June 2022, these proved futile for a longterm sustainable arrangement due to rigid attitude and demands of the TTP leadership .
The Biden Administration despite the strength of Pakistan’s contention preferred to keep itself aloof on these issues possibly showing its resentment to Pakistan on its two decade long Afghan campaign. However, the Trump Administration has been responsive to Pakistan’s concerns on terrorism and has designated BLA and Majeed Brigade in the category of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) .
However, for Pakistan too it would be wrong to put the blame of increasing terrorism in Pakistan squarely on Afghanistan or on the Afghan Taliban. In fact, the roots of terrorism in Pakistan, like in Afghanistan, are much deeper and related to the events and policies of past several decades. An exclusive military strategy to deal with menace of terrorism has proved to be counter-productive. Pakistan needs a comprehensive policy with effective linkages between counter-terrorism, counter-radicalism and counter-violent extremism for steering out of the decades of indoctrination and systemic radicalization.
The Counter-Terrorism policy should also distinguish between the nuances of the TTP and BLA-related terrorism. In case of the TTP, the focus has to be on reintegration of the fighters into political and economic mainstreams of the life. The people in the merged FATA districts with heavy concentration of the TTP should be taken into confidence in the CT operations and should be provided with adequate development funds. In Balochistan, the government has to ensure political empowerment of the Baloch communities to address the deprivation and grievances along with a massive economic reconstruction plan.
Afghanistan and Pakistan should work together on a
coordinated approach on counter-terrorism to foster a bilateral security
dialogue which avoids finger pointing and blame-game of the past and instead
helps the two sides to develop and strengthen practical cooperation in
preventing acts of terrorism on each other’s soil. Towards that end, it is
vital to reform and reorient the relations between the security and
intelligence institutions of the two countries. The institutional differences
and distrust between the National Directorate of Security (NDS) of Afghanistan
and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan during the 2001-2021 period
prevented meaningful security cooperation between the two countries. Ironically,
these differences have continued to exist between the two countries in some
proportion even after the Taliban takeover in 2021. However, it is now vital
for both sides to take cognizance that a trust-based security partnership is in
their mutual interest for eliminating decades-old extremist and terrorist
violence from the two countries.
The global and regional geo-political considerations
underline the significance of cooperation with China as well as the U.S. in the
area of counter-terrorism. China is a neighbour of both Afghanistan and
Pakistan having crucial stakes in peace and stability in the region. All the
three countries, Afghanistan, Pakistan and China are threatened by terrorism
emanating from groups like the ISKP, TTP, BLA, ETIM and other terrorist outfits
operating in the region. The three countries have recently re-activated the
trilateral China-Afghanistan-Pakistan forum for developing convergence in the
security and counter-terrorism and promoting economic cooperation and regional
connectivity. On its part, China has also been supportive of Pakistan
maintaining close engagement with the United States and Western allies in the
field of counter-terrorism as such cooperation serves the common purpose of
combating shared threat of terrorism, radicalism and violent extremism .
Close collaboration on security and terrorism-related matters has continued to exist between Pakistan and the United States since days of Afghan Jihad except some interruptions in 1990s and recently following the U.S. and NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, following Pakistan-India military clashes both countries seem to be again cozying up with each other to strengthen cooperation in security and economic fields. Two back to back visits by Pakistan’s Army Chief to the U.S. indicate that convergence is re-emerging between the two countries in many areas including the threat of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan.
A strong Joint Statement on U.S.-Pakistan
Counterterrorism Dialogue after the meeting of the two delegations in Islamabad
on 12 August 2025 reaffirms shared commitment to combating terrorism,
developing effective approaches against groups like BLA, ISKP and TTP including
countering the use of emerging technologies for terrorism purposes and working
closely in multilateral fora on counterterrorism issues .
These U.S.-Pakistan convergence on counterterrorism is being welcomed in the U.S. as well as Pakistan. The U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio after the designation of BLA and its alias Majeed Brigade said “Terrorist designations play a critical role in our fight against the scourge and are an effective way to curtail support of terrorist activities”.
Balochistan’s Chief Minister Sarfaraz Bugti also said “We welcome the U.S. decision to designate BLA and its alias Majeed Brigade as terrorist outfits” . A renowned U.S. expert on security and strategic issues based in Washington Michael Kugelman posted on X “The U.S.-Pakistan counterterrorism dialogue joint statement is one of the most positive and effusive I have seen from these countries on CT for quite a few years. It reads like something from the immediate post-9/11 years. We have come a long way in very little time” .
Pakistan and Afghanistan working closely in coordination
with each other on the Chinese and the U.S. tracks to counterterrorism can be a
productive approach for elimination of decades-old terrorism, radicalism and
violent extremism from Afghanistan and Pakistan. While Pakistan’s interaction
with the U.S. in security and counterterrorism is improving, there still remain
serious gaps on the roadmap for engagement between the U.S. and the Afghan
Interim Government and the recognition of a Taliban-led Afghanistan in the UN.
In view of the situation prevailing since 2021 and the Afghan Interim Government
staying out of the regional and international counterterrorism frameworks, the
possibility of Afghanistan-Pakistan border region transcending into a new phase
of wider counter-terrorism war or re-activation of a form of “Over the Horizon
(OTH) Strategy” would entail disastrous
implications and would be contrary to the interests of durable peace and
stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region.
III. Peoples’
Movements, Economic Cooperation and Trade
People to people relations have been the most important
feature of the bilateral relations. Peoples living in both sides are related to
each other through familial, tribal, religious, cultural and economic linkages.
Based on centuries-old history of the region, thousands of people cross border
every day, many of them more than once during 24 hours. This movement and
interaction between the people has been so peaceful that it is often quoted by
the elders that the border even remained opened during Pakistan’s wars with
India on the eastern front in 1965 and 1971 without deployment of any troops on
this Western border. An interaction with border officials on different
crossings indicates that an estimated 40,000-50,000 individuals continue to
cross border every day from various designated and non-designated border
crossings because of their social and economic needs .
However, as a result of the war against terrorism and the
U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan, the movement between the two countries
has become difficult and restricted. Visa is now being imposed strictly in
order to ensure documented movement of the people. The introduction of online
visa regime by Pakistan has also not succeeded in resolving the problems of
Pakistani visa for Afghan nationals. Pakistanis desirous of visiting
Afghanistan also face a highly restrictive Afghan visa regime and harassment of
the visitors by security and intelligence authorities. These restrictions have
not only significantly reduced the volume of trade and business exchanges with
Afghanistan but has also brought down the number of family visits that has been
historically an important part of people to people relations between Pakistan
and Afghanistan. The solution to this problem lies in evolving a
technology-based and data-driven process allowing the documented travel between
the two countries in a facilitative manner and not continue to brush the issue
aside.
In view of Afghanistan being an epicenter of war, conflict
and militancy for past half century, the economic business and trade exchanges
of Afghanistan with the neighbouring countries especially Pakistan have remained
undeveloped and primitive. Afghanistan being a landlocked country, the bulk of
the trade and transit takes place through the long border between the two
countries, but the border crossings are too little in number and not equipped
for modern trade and business exchanges still following nineteenth century
practices and procedures. As a result, the annual bilateral trade only grew to
a maximum of $3 billion a year during the U.S. and NATO years around 2011-12
and has subsequently continued to decrease. Following the Taliban takeover, due
to economic and banking restrictions on the regime and a reduced demand the
bilateral trade is hovering around just $ 1 billion a year – an embarrassingly
low figure for the two countries with large populations of 250 million and 40
million respectively.
Despite Pakistan being historically a favored transit route
for Afghan cargo to the world, the quantum of the Afghan transit through
Pakistan has also continued to progressively decline. The Afghan Pakistan
Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) signed in 2010 replacing the Afghan Transit
Agreement (ATA) of 1965 was not fully responsive to the needs of Afghan
transit. The Afghan leaders from the past and present government have continued to say that Pakistan’s ports
are the most desirable transit route for Pakistan but these are not the most
reliable and dependable routes. The APTTA expired in 2020 and in the absence of
an agreement between the two sides has been kept functional unilaterally by
Pakistan side on ad-hoc basis. Due to frequent disruptions caused by border
closures, a significant part of the transit has shifted to other relatively
difficult routes through Iran and Central Asian states.
The primary reason for lack of business and economic
exchanges between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been disruptive bilateral
engagement and low priority being attached by the two sides to economic
interaction including trade, transit and investment framework. The presence of
the two decade-long U.S. and NATO forces was not used by the two sides for
focusing on economic realities. Relations between governments in Pakistan and
Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani eras remained strained, to put it quite mildly.
Since 2001, the distrust between the two sides has continued to grow with blame
game and political point-scoring in the public domain dominating the discourse
instead of efforts for promoting harmony and dialogue between the two states.
Contrary to expectations, this trend among the governments has not ended even after the resumption of government in Kabul by the Taliban in 2021. While the Afghan Taliban regime has been faced with sanctions and economic restrictions during past four years, their reluctance to use economic and social exchanges with Pakistan towards strengthening peace and stability explains for the level of mutual distrust. Ironically, both countries have continued to ignore a pertinent reality that coming out of the long era of conflict, wars and terrorism requires meaningful transformation in past approaches to their relations and interaction by addressing the fundamentals of the relations.
It is important to reiterate, even at the cost of
repetition, that the crux of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations is in people to
people interaction which should be used as a key leverage for promoting
friendship between the two countries. Pakistan being the host to largest number
of Afghan refugees has yielded many advantages that Pakistan can, and should,
use as instruments for enhancing our positive influence. In past five decades,
several hundred thousand Afghans have been educated in Pakistan at the same
expense that is incurred by the state of Pakistan on Pakistani students. More
than 100,000 Afghans who graduated from Pakistan are serving in Afghanistan’s
public and private sector institutions. If appropriately used, they can be an
important source of Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan, irrespective of the
ruling party or group in that country. For many many years, Pakistan has
continued to award at least 1,000 scholarships annually for Afghan students in
Pakistan’s professional colleges and universities.
All Afghan governments and the people of Afghanistan have
recognized Pakistan’s passion and contribution in hosting millions of Afghan
refugees with open arms, like no other country in the world has done. However,
repatriation of Afghan refugees, as and when it happens, should be done in a
dignified manner and fulfilling humanitarian considerations. Pushing Afghans
who have lived in the country for decades or those who have been born in Pakistan
into Afghanistan without considering their plight, belongings and businesses
here would leave scars on bilateral relations. Repatriation has to be a planned
process spanning over at least a few years and systematically dividing the
refugees into various categories. Most importantly, people to people relations
and the refugee matters have to be dealt constructively to strengthen economic
and humanitarian interaction between the two countries.
IV. Impact of
Global Geo-political Currents
The current era in global geopolitics is characterized by
complex polarization and discord. The Post-World War II order which was
premised on respect for sovereignty and adherence to rule of law in
international relations is crumbling with increasing instances of unilateralism
and imposed wars and crimes against humanity especially against vulnerable
states and peoples. Wars in Ukraine, Israel’s genocide against Palestinians in
Gaza, Israeli and U.S. strikes against Iran and wars between Thailand and
Cambodia and Azerbaijan and Armenia are some of the manifestations of the
increasing turbulence in the world.
A group of states is evolving as an alternate pole in the
U.S.-dominated world order being gradually weakened by the emerging ground
realities and re-alignments. China and Russia along with the fora such as SCO
and BRICS are gaining political and economic influence in the world. The
U.S.-led networks to counter the rise of China such as Quad are also falling
apart as witnessed by the expanding rift between India and the U.S. and
latter’s increasing convergence with Pakistan. The U.S. President Donald
Trump’s tariff war against almost all the countries of the world is adding to
the polarity in the global politics.
In such an acutely polarized world, durable peace, stability
and restoration of Afghanistan to its normalized place is a seemingly low
international priority. China, Russia, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asian countries
and many Gulf states are gradually expanding their relations with Afghan
Interim Government hoping that broadening of engagement would enhance stability
in Afghanistan and likely bring the changes in the Taliban’s policies on
inclusivity, human rights and counter-terrorism. Given the gaps in the
engagement between the U.S. and its Western allies and the Taliban, developing
consensus on the action in the UN Security Council for removal of sanctions
against the Taliban and lifting of the western countries’ sanctions against
Afghan economy are apparently unlikely in the short-term due to prevailing
geo-political environment as well as lack of progress in many key areas by the
Taliban regime.
Paradoxically, an enhanced U.S.-China rivalry in the region
entails the risk of a resurgence of a new war against terrorism particularly in
Afghanistan-Pakistan border region which can have negative implications for
stabilizing already turbulent Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas. To avoid that
kind of scenario, a balancing act will be important on part of Pakistan and
Afghanistan in dealing with security and counterterrorism challenges with a
degree of caution and sagacity. It would require Pakistan and Afghanistan to
enhance their understanding on ground realities, work closely on their
bilateral relations and have effective trilateral interactions with China and
the U.S., respectively. One way of managing tensions and rivalries is to create
common economic stakes in the region
V. Regional
Cooperation and Connectivity
Regional cooperation and connectivity offer huge incentives
for promoting durable peace, stability and harmony in the region. Pakistan and
Afghanistan are the hub of connectivity being located at the confluence of
several regions including Central Asia, West Asia, Eurasia, Middle East and
South Asia. The trans-Afghan connectivity projects and initiatives such as
TAPI, CASA-1000, Lapis Lazuli corridor and China-Afghanistan logistics
connectivity have not been able to make considerable progress because of the
war and instability that prevailed in Afghanistan for several decades and the
wave of terrorism in bordering regions of Pakistan, especially Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Even after the withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO
forces from Afghanistan in August 2021 and formation of a Taliban government
there, the UN sanctions on the Taliban and economic and banking restrictions
against Afghanistan as well as the security and terrorism threats have
continued to prevent major economic initiatives to move forward in a meaningful
way.
Another factor that has continued to impede initiatives of
regional economic integration has been the stalemate in India-Pakistan
relations. The Indian attitude in the past two decades has been to deny any
space to Pakistan with a view to subjugate it by inflicting maximum pressure
and economic damage. India has kept SAARC hostage since 2016 by boycotting
Pakistan’s turn for hosting the organization’s Summit and its Presidency.
India’s maneuvering with Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries during the
years of the U.S. and NATO presence in Afghanistan has been key factor in scuttling
initiatives for Central Asia South Asia connectivity.
The regional politics, however, is beginning to undergo a
subtle change. Since the establishment of the second Islamic Emirate in
Afghanistan, Central Asian countries have adopted a positively nuanced strategy
of maintaining and strengthening economic engagement with Afghanistan while
leaving their political and ideological differences aside. This has led to
positive signals coming from three Central Asia countries bordering Afghanistan
– Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. The framework agreement for
feasibility study of the trilateral railway project between Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Uzbekistan has been signed recently in Kabul .
Turkmenistan has also been showing keen interest in taking
projects like TAPI, TAP (Turkmenistan Afghanistan Pakistan) power transmission
line and developing a supply framework of LNG from Turkmenistan to Pakistan
through Chaman border crossing. Tajikistan, which historically has serious
political issues with the Taliban governments in Afghanistan has also shown
signs of constructive engagement with the Afghan Interim Government with a view
to strengthen economic cooperation and connectivity as a way towards
stabilization of its relations with Afghanistan.
Central Asia and South Asia have continued to struggle for
making progress on evolving regional trade and transit framework. In the
previous years, Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries have continued to
express their interest in access to India through Pakistan’s land routes, which
has not been possible because of India’s reluctance towards normalizing
relations with Pakistan. In view of Pakistan’s increasing significance and
alignments at global and regional level, a thinking is emerging in the Central
Asian countries to go for connectivity with Pakistan through Afghanistan and
India which can be later roped into the process when it is willing to
appreciate the realities on the ground. At Termez Dialogue held in Termez visa
free trade zone that Uzbekistan has exclusively developed on Afghan border for
promoting business, trade and humanitarian contacts with Afghanistan, the
participating experts and think tanks relayed positive vibes about moving
forward on connectivity projects with South Asia .
Pakistan and Afghanistan have to take corresponding measures
for realization of this historic opportunity of changing the direction of the
regional politics from mutual political dissent to incorporating an economic
approach to attain stability and progress. The discourse on Afghanistan
Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) should actually be broadened to
transform it into a Regional Transit Trade Agreement (RTTA) linking South Asia
with Central Asia and and explore future trade and transit connectivity with
Russia in the north and other West Asian and Eurasian trading zones. A progress
in this direction would incentivize development of much-needed
Pakistan-Afghanistan infrastructure in road, railways and energy as well as
adequate border crossing facilities and procedures to handle regional trade and
transit.
Despite India-Pakistan relations currently being in a
serious confrontational mode, Pakistan can use this opportunity to be
innovative and futuristic in terms of its thinking on transit through its land
ports and crossing points. The RTTA allowing two-way flow of goods from
Pakistan’s land crossing points with India can significantly enhance Pakistan’s
strategic and economic leverages and further strengthen Pakistan’s image in its
partnerships with Central Asia and Afghanistan.
The recent developments have reaffirmed the significance of
Afghanistan-China-Pakistan trilateral economic linkages. Both Pakistan and
Afghanistan cannot utilize the full potential of trade and economic linkages
with China without developing supportive economic linkages with that country.
Towards this end, the interaction at trilateral level in recent months had
reiterated commitment for moving forward on extension of CPEC to Pakistan. The
three countries will also have to take effective measures for developping and
strengthening logistics and supply chain network to ensure substantive flows of
trade, transit and services relating to China.
In order to capitalize on the enticing opportunities for
regional economic integration, Pakistan and Afghanistan need to reshape their
engagement with the lens of economy, trade, transit and business. The two
countries require to develop effective transportation, communication and
logistic networks linking Kabul, Jalalabad and Peshawar and in the south between
Kandahar and Quetta. Other border crossings along the long border have to be
made functional and facilitative to trade, transit and economic exchanges.
It is also important to underline that the economic, business and connectivity agenda requires secure environment and addressing threats of violence and terrorism emanating from various groups in the region. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan need to take care of the security challenges on their respective soils and strengthen the bilateral engagement to effectively overcome the cross-border threats.
Recommendations
Pakistan and Afghanistan today are at a crossroads after the
decades of war, militancy and external military interventions in Afghanistan
which have also seriously affected the fabric of natural relations between
Pakistan and Afghanistan. The border areas on Pakistan side particularly the
provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are also witnessing a phase of
instability aggravated by Afghan developments as well as other factors. The
recent developments in the region, however, point towards improved prospects of
stability, harmony and progress.
Following the withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO forces, war
and conflict in the country has seemingly ended though return of Afghanistan to
full normalization in the global order would require addressing issues of
constitutionalism, human rights and counterterrorism in a more comprehensive
way and in accordance with norms of international relations and law. In the
meantime, Afghanistan’s engagement with major powers, is gradually expanding
and its neighbours want to put the turbulent past behind and move to a new era
of regional economic integration and connectivity.
On its part, in recent years Pakistan has significantly
strengthened its global and regional partnerships. With a strategic partnership
with China and an increasing mutual trust in relations with the U.S., Pakistan
is distinctly poised to play a role of a pivot of stability in the region. In
addition, Pakistan’s engagement with key regional countries such as Russia,
Turkey, Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Qatar also continues to grow in
substance. Most importantly, in a military escalation imposed by India in May
this year Pakistan not only gave a befitting response but also proved its
credentials as a mature player in international politics and diplomacy.
At this defining juncture, Pakistan and Afghanistan need to
focus on their bilateral dynamics and work out a model of engagement to enable
them to not only tackle the challenges of security and terrorism threatening
the regional peace and stability, but steer their way towards bilateral
cooperation in trade and economy and regional connectivity and economic
integration.
Following are key recommendations to the states of Pakistan
and Afghanistan, in this regard:
- Strengthen
state to state relations based on the principles of respect for sovereignty and
non-interference in internal affairs of each other,
- Deepen
institutional contacts to foster cooperative relations in political, security
and economic domains,
- Attach
priority to addressing issues of the people to people exchanges and growth of
bilateral trade, transit and business,
- Promote
initiatives, endeavours and projects for regional connectivity and economic
integration,
- Avoid their countries and the region from becoming theatre of a new regional proxy war or battle ground of major power rivalry.
About the Author
Mansoor Ahmad Khan is a seasoned career diplomat who served as Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Vienna and Ambassador to Austria and Slovak Republic from June 2018 to August 2020, representing Pakistan at key multilateral bodies such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. In September 2020, Ambassador Khan was appointed Pakistan’s Ambassador to Afghanistan.
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