Four Years on: Pakistan’s hard policy choices in Afghanistan

Pakistan's Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, left, shakes hands with Afghanistan's Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi before their meeting in Kabul, Afghanistan [File: Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs]

Future Asia Special

ISLAMABAD, 26 Sept 2025: Pakistan’s efforts to woo Afghan Taliban away from banned Tehrik Taliban Pakistan have failed to yield any results. This makes Islamabad framing of policy towards Taliban-controlled Afghanistan challenging. Policies of using carrots and sticks at the same time have been futile.

The forceful eviction of millions of Afghan refugees and elevation of Afghan Taliban chargé d'affaires in Islamabad couple with several high-level visits have not helped much. The level of allegations and denials remains the same. Meanwhile, number of casualties in the Pakistani districts bordering Afghanistan continue to mount, further exacerbated by collateral damage in Tirah. Public sentiments are mostly anti-military operation in these areas.

Does Pakistan need to change it course, or continue with putting pressure on the ruling Islamic movement in Kabul?  

Pakistan has always faced difficulty in shaping its Afghan policy. Many analysts believe one of the reasons could be the way Pakistan looks at Afghanistan through these years. “Its own policy has been dwindling between strategic depth to a constant headache,” said one.

Policymakers understand that the Taliban’s diplomatic and economic isolation could make Afghanistan more of a burden than an asset for Islamabad. But at the same time, the Taliban’s failure to act against Pakistani militants operating from Afghan territory could endanger its internal security.

Some Afghan policy experts believe that if the Taliban continue to deny requests to expel or restrict the TTP, Islamabad may turn to an alternative approach. “Instead of relying solely on the Taliban, Pakistan could engage Afghan political leaders, outspoken anti-Taliban civil society voices, and human rights activists—especially those currently living in Pakistan,” they suggest.

A recent attempt was by a pro-establishment non-governmental organization South Asian Strategic Stability Institute University (SASSIU) to hold anti-Taliban leaders gathering in Islamabad. Obviously, not to the liking of the ruling hardliners n Afghanistan, the meeting has not yet taken place.   

In the past, Pakistan distanced itself from figures like Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, both of whom still hold some influence within Afghan circles. Re-engaging with such political and civil leaders could provide Islamabad with leverage beyond the Taliban.

A senior journalist Sami Yousafzai told The Future Asia that “Relying on the Taliban alone has proven costly, and doubling down on this strategy will not be an easy option.

“This time, however, Pakistan might consider supporting groups that advocate for human rights, women’s rights, and broader civil freedoms. Such a shift would not only diversify Pakistan’s Afghan policy but could also help “wash away” the legacy of the past 50 years, during which Pakistan invested heavily in jihadist movements—a policy widely seen as a strategic mistake,” he suggests.

Sami says some anti-Taliban political and military leaders residing in Paris and other European cities have come to understand that if Pakistan agrees and supports them, they were ready to come to Pakistan to organize a regular resistance against the Afghan Taliban. He further adds that these Afghan leaders think the Taliban's continuous support for the TTP is an extremely unwise gamble, the reality of whose negative consequences the Afghan Taliban may never fully comprehend.

Due to the relationship between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP, millions of Afghan refugees have already faced severe difficulties in Pakistan.

Islamabad will probably not cut its close ties with the new rulers in Kabul. It should use those ties carefully, to nudge the Taliban toward compromises on governance, including on respect for basic rights and adherence to counter-terrorism commitments that might win them greater favour abroad and help ease Afghanistan’s humanitarian tragedy.

It’s not yet clear that whether Pakistan has used the card of formal recognition of the Taliban regime in return for promise to weed out TTP presence there. Yet Pakistan is advocating for the Taliban’s cause in other ways on the international stage. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar did plead Taliban’s case at a conference in the US on the sidelines of the United Nations General assembly meeting.

Ishaq Dar laid out six points of action: He highlighted the following:

1. The OIC Group must advocate for adequate funding by the international donors to meet Afghanistan’s humanitarian aid requirements without any political considerations.
2. The OIC group must help stabilize the Afghan economy and revive its banking systems to create conditions necessary for trade and commercial activity and for the implementation of regional connectivity projects. This will help reduce unemployment and lift ordinary Afghans out of poverty.
3. We must support engagement and dialogue with the Taliban at the regional and multilateral level to encourage them to comply with their international obligations.
4. We commend UN led efforts to help ex-poppy farmers secure alternate livelihoods and must support these endeavors to create further opportunities for a sustainable future for Afghan cultivators.
5. The OIC group must urge the Taliban to lift restrictions on women and girls that are unjustified and contrary to Islamic principles and norms of Muslim society. Our outreach efforts must be directed to influence the Taliban to rethink their policies towards this end.
6. With peace returning to Afghanistan, it is now time for Afghan refugees to return to their homeland. The OIC Group must urge the Afghan interim authorities to create conditions necessary for facilitating the re-settlement of Afghan returnees from neighboring countries and to ensure their integration into the political and social fabric of Afghanistan for lasting peace and stability. The international community must also share the burden of this responsibility.

It’s obvious in policy pronouncements and at multilateral forums, Islamabad is urging outside powers, particularly the U.S. and its Western allies, to engage with the Taliban, lift economic sanctions, and supply Kabul with both humanitarian and economic assistance. 

Pakistani policymakers warn – rightly – that continued sanctions and freezes on donor assistance will result in the Afghan economy’s complete meltdown, worsening an already grave humanitarian crisis. They also emphasise that the West is more likely to moderate Taliban behaviour through incentives than through punitive measures.

But the question is given the failure of its own carrots n sticks policy, how can it argue the same recipe for the global community? Despite such differences, Pakistan is unlikely to abandon its Afghan allies.

After Russia, other countries such as Iran and China that have opted for closer engagement with the Taliban government and they too are unlikely to officially recognise it any time soon. Pakistan, then may not be far.