South Asia Transition: Pakistan, Bangladesh Find Common Ground with China in the Middle

Conceptual Image of Unity and Collaboration: Chatly.ai

By Ali Furqan, Special for Future Asia

Pakistan–Bangladesh relations, long overshadowed by historical grievances and decades of political estrangement, are witnessing a tentative but significant thaw.

Recent high-level interactions including Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s “warm and cordial” meeting with Bangladesh’s Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus at the sidelines of UNGA in September 2025 and at the D-8 summit in Cairo (December 2024), as well as Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar’s official visit to Dhaka in August 2025 mark the most substantial progress in bilateral diplomacy since the early 2000s.

 These engagements have opened channels for trade, people-to-people exchanges, and diplomatic normalization.

This report argues that the Pakistan–Bangladesh thaw, supported by China’s economic and diplomatic leverage, represents an inflection point in South Asian geopolitics. If nurtured with pragmatism, this opening could yield transformative outcomes in trade, regional connectivity, and security cooperation. However, sustaining momentum will require cautious diplomacy, de-linking bilateral relations from the India factor, and prioritizing economic pragmatism over ideological or historical contestation.

The broader geopolitical backdrop amplifies the importance of this rapprochement. Since August 2024, South Asia’s strategic landscape has been reshaped by an emerging trilateral framework involving China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

Driven by Dhaka’s political transition and Beijing’s regional ambitions, this trilateral mechanism is expanding cooperation across trade, agriculture, health, climate, and military modernization.

Bangladesh’s potential acquisition of the Pakistan–China JF-17 fighter jet and participation in Pakistan’s “Aman 2025” naval exercise underscore the shifting contours of regional security alignments.

While opportunities abound, challenges remain acute. The legacy of 1971 continues to shape domestic sensitivities in both Pakistan and Bangladesh. India, historically Bangladesh’s closest partner, views the trilateral convergence as a direct challenge to its regional dominance, raising the risk of diplomatic pushback.

Moreover, Bangladesh’s interim administration is navigating a fragile political environment ahead of elections, constraining Dhaka’s willingness to commit to bold realignments.

Setting the Stage

For over five decades since 1971, Pakistan–Bangladesh relations have largely remained hostage to history. Diplomatic contact was sporadic, economic interaction underdeveloped, and symbolic gestures such as the signing of over 100 Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) since 2015 produced little tangible cooperation.

With direct flights suspended, visa regimes restrictive, and mutual political mistrust prevalent, the relationship had effectively stagnated.

This inertia began to shift in mid-2024 when two parallel developments converged: the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government in Dhaka and Beijing’s growing efforts to knit South Asian states into a broader framework of economic and strategic cooperation.

Under the interim government led by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, Dhaka began signaling greater openness toward engagement with Pakistan. In parallel, China sought to transform its bilateral partnerships into a trilateral arrangement involving both Islamabad and Dhaka.

By late 2024 and into 2025, these shifts yielded substantive progress. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s “warm and cordial” meeting with Muhammad Yunus at the UNGA in New York (September 2025) followed by the D-8 summit in Cairo (December 2024) reopened channels that had long been dormant. The official statement noted that the talks were conducted in a “cordial and friendly atmosphere, reflecting the mutual commitment of both countries to work together for the well-being of their people and the stability of South Asia.” This language is significant: it signals that both sides view bilateral reconciliation not only to improve ties but also as a contribution to regional stability.

As Ambassador Rafiul Zaman Siddiqui, a South Asia expert and former envoy, talking to The Future Asia (TFA) observed: “SAARC has no real future given India’s behavior. Countries like Bangladesh now realize that moving forward requires new regional platforms. The Pakistan–Bangladesh–China trilateral is one such step and India is naturally concerned about being left out.”

Recent Developments in Bilateral Relations

The thaw between Pakistan and Bangladesh has been symbolized by a series of high-level meetings after years of near silence. Prime Minister Sharif’s engagements with Chief Adviser Yunus at the UNGA and D-8 summit signaled a readiness to reset ties. Yunus, in turn, appreciated Pakistan’s initiative to deepen engagement and stressed the importance of bilateral trade and cultural linkages.

Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar’s official visit to Dhaka in August 2025 was particularly significant. It not only reaffirmed Pakistan’s readiness for reconciliation but also focused on practical measures: expanding trade volume, easing visa issuance, and restoring direct air connectivity steps that can materially shape public perceptions of the relationship.

Pakistan and Bangladesh delegations meeting at the sidelines of UNGA in Septermber 2025 (PID)

Ambassador Siddiqui assessed the visit as a breakthrough: 

“Two decades had passed with the doors closed between the two countries. Even the Foreign Secretaries’ Joint Group was not functioning. But now, with trade resuming, visas easing, and talks of restoring direct flights, a real opening has emerged.”

Public opinion dynamics in Bangladesh also plays a role. Siddiqui highlighted that “for decades, since 1971, India enjoyed overwhelming influence in Bangladesh. But after August 2024, following the fall of the Awami League, the situation has changed dramatically. The Bangladeshi public is no longer content with India’s dominant role.”

This view is reinforced by Ambassador Afrasiab Mehdi Hashmi while talking to TFA, who served as Pakistan’s envoy in Dhaka: “Bangladesh has its own geographical and political weight in the region. India has long treated it as a subordinate, but Dhaka is seeking more strategic autonomy. Its growing engagement with China and Pakistan naturally worries New Delhi.”

Both ambassadors also urge caution. Siddiqui stressed that Pakistan must not frame its engagement with Dhaka through an “India lens: 

“Islamabad should avoid interpreting every opening in the context of India. Our relationship with Bangladesh must be bilateral, not triangular.”

The Trilateral Dynamic: China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh

Since August 2024, the most striking development in South Asia has been the emergence of a Pakistan–Bangladesh–China trilateral framework. In June 2025, the inaugural trilateral dialogue in Kunming brought officials from all three countries together, discussing cooperation in trade, agriculture, health, industry, and climate change.

China’s role has been pivotal. Its economic presence in Bangladesh has expanded rapidly through projects like the Payra Deep Seaport and Matarbari Power Plant. With bilateral trade between China and Bangladesh reaching USD 24 billion in 2024, Beijing is already Dhaka’s largest trading partner. By linking Pakistan into its economic diplomacy, Beijing is effectively transforming bilateral ties into a triangular platform with strategic overtones.

For Pakistan, the trilateral format provides a platform to normalize relations with Dhaka under China’s diplomatic umbrella, framing the rapprochement in economic rather than purely political terms.

Defense and security dimensions further underscore the trilateral’s significance. Bangladesh’s interest in acquiring JF-17 fighter jets and its participation in Pakistan’s “Aman 2025” naval exercise mark the rekindling of long-dormant military-to-military ties.

Ambassador Hashmi situates this shift in identity politics: “Bangladesh’s people have always maintained a soft corner for Pakistan, because of their Muslim identity. They see that separating from Pakistan brought them closer to India’s sphere, something not entirely acceptable to their sense of Muslim nationalism. This creates natural space for Pakistan to re-engage.”

Enduring Challenges

Despite the optimism, several obstacles remain:

The 1971 Legacy - Historical memory remains the single biggest obstacle. 

Ambassador Siddiqui warns: “This is a fifty-year-old issue. Dialogue, not haste, is the way to understand each other’s perspectives.”

India’s Reaction - New Delhi sees any trilateral convergence as a threat. Hashmi cautions: “India views Pakistan–Bangladesh openings as a zero-sum game. The trilateral mechanism makes it particularly uneasy.”

Domestic Politics in Dhaka - The interim government under Yunus favors recalibration, but electoral politics may reverse progress if Awami League regains influence.

Implementation Deficit - Over 100 MoUs since 2015 have seen negligible follow-through. Without institutional capacity, momentum risks dissipating.

Future Outlook and Policy Recommendations

Prioritize Economic Diplomacy: Focus on trade facilitation, direct flights, and banking channels before tackling sensitive issues.

Avoid the “India Lens”: Build ties on bilateral logic, not as an anti-India strategy.

Leverage Trilateral Platforms: Use Chinese facilitation to institutionalize cooperation.

Expand People-to-People Linkages: Student exchanges, cultural programs, and tourism can strengthen grassroots goodwill.

Exercise Strategic Patience: Avoid rushing into historical debates; let trust accumulate through practical cooperation.

Future Outlook

Pakistan–Bangladesh relations are undergoing a quiet but significant transformation. The convergence of Dhaka’s recalibration under Muhammad Yunus, Islamabad’s proactive diplomacy under Shehbaz Sharif and Ishaq Dar, and Beijing’s trilateral initiative has created a rare window of opportunity.

This moment is fragile. Its success depends on whether Islamabad and Dhaka can translate symbolism into substance while managing India’s anxieties. As Ambassador Hashmi remarked: “Bangladesh has its own weight. It will not remain in India’s shadow forever. For Pakistan, the key is to engage with confidence, patience, and a vision for South Asia beyond old rivalries.”

In this sense, Pakistan’s engagement with Bangladesh is more than a bilateral reset. It is part of the broader contest over South Asia’s future; one in which China’s economic diplomacy, India’s anxieties, and Pakistan’s search for regional relevance all intersect. If carefully managed, this rapprochement could help Islamabad and Dhaka move beyond history and towards a pragmatic, mutually beneficial future.

__

Ali Furqan is an Islamabad-based journalist with over two decades of experience covering politics, regional security, and foreign affairs. His work focuses on South Asian affairs, regional stability, and global policy shifts. He is currently a fellow at The Future Asia.