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| Pakistan currently heads the all important UN Security Council. Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar meeting the UN chief last month (Credit: UN website) |
Between January and June
2025, the Council adopted just 16 resolutions—down from 20 in the same period
last year. 2024 had already marked a historic low, ending with only 46
resolutions, the fewest since 1991.
The first half tally for
2025 continues a clear downward trend, reflecting not only institutional
fatigue but also persistent divisions that are hampering consensus.
According to the UN
statement, another notable trend that has continued this year has been the high
percentage of non-unanimous adoptions; in this regard, seven of the 16
resolutions or about 44 percent, through the end of June 2025, have been
adopted without the support of all 15 Council members.
These seven were on a
range of country files, including Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and
Yemen. Four of them were sanctions-related resolutions; this is not surprising,
as sanctions, which have traditionally been a source of tension in the Council,
have become increasingly controversial in recent years.
The difficulty in
obtaining consensus is also seen in the low number of presidential statements.
In the first half of 2025, the council adopted four presidential statements,
the same number it adopted in the first half of 2024. The seven presidential
statements adopted in 2024 were only one more than the six adopted in 2023,
which was the lowest number since the Council began using its current
documentation for presidential statements in 1994.
Vetoes were cast in the
first half of 2025 on two politically charged topics: the war in Ukraine and
the Israel-Hamas war.
On 24 February, Russia
vetoed two separate amendments related to a US-drafted resolution on Ukraine.
Both amendments to the resolution were proposed by the council’s five European
members (Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia, and the UK). The resolution passed
with ten positive votes but with abstentions from the five European members.
On 4 June, the US vetoed
a draft resolution penned by all ten elected members of the Council that
demanded a ceasefire in Gaza, recalled the Council’s demand for the release of
all hostages in Gaza, and demanded the immediate and unconditional lifting of
all restrictions on the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza.
The council held fewer meetings in the first half of this year (191) in comparison with the first half of last year (214), although it spent nearly as much time in meetings. From January to June, council members spent a total of 355 hours in 122 formal (public and private) and 69 informal (consultations and informal interactive dialogues) meetings. Between January and June 2024, they spent 358.5 hours in 151 formal and 63 informal meetings.
One notable factor in
these statistics is the drop-off in the number of meetings so far this year on
“The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question”. By the
end of June, the Council held a total of 22 meetings on this file, in comparison
to 34 between January and June 2024.
This may be in part
because of the fatigue from focusing intensively on the issue without
meaningful positive results on the ground. The clear US position of not
countenancing any decision that it perceives as critical of Israel may also
have been a factor.
Uncertain US positions
The start of Donald J.
Trump’s second term in the White House on 20 January heralded a significant
change in US policy in the Security Council. While not unanticipated, the new
administration has questioned the council’s work on climate change; objected to
certain aspects of the women, peace and security agenda; and sought to qualify
the language of international humanitarian law in some Council outcomes.
The US position on
Ukraine has also shifted since 20 January, perhaps more so than on any other
country-specific file. The clearest indication of this was Washington’s
introduction of what ultimately became resolution 2774. While the US proposal
urged a lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine and implored a swift end to
the conflict, it notably omitted references to Ukraine’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity and avoided condemning Russia’s invasion in February
2022.
Resolution 2774 was
adopted with ten votes in favour and five abstentions, all of which were cast
by the European members of the Council (France, Denmark, Greece, Slovenia, and
the UK). (For more on the US position in the Council on Ukraine and developments
on this issue in the General Assembly, please see our March 2025 In Hindsight.)
While Trump has taken a
more critical tone of late towards Russia’s ongoing conflict in Ukraine, it is
unclear how this will translate into US positions on the file in the Security
Council for the remainder of the year.
Some Positives
Notwithstanding the
difficulties facing the council in early 2025, there were some positive
developments. Despite the 4 June US veto on a resolution on the situation in
Gaza, it was encouraging that elected members came together to try to break an
impasse in the council on an intractable issue. This built on the practice of
all elected members collaborating as co-penholders in March 2024 on a
resolution on Gaza, which demanded an immediate ceasefire to the war in Gaza
during the month of Ramadan, leading to a “lasting sustainable ceasefire”. Such
E10 penholdership could serve as a model for future action on other difficult
issues.
Another encouraging
development this year has been the “peacekeeping trio” initiated by three
elected members—Denmark, Pakistan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK)—to emphasise
the importance of focusing on the future of peacekeeping. As part of this
initiative, Denmark convened an open debate on 24 March during its Council
presidency on “Advancing Adaptability in UN Peace Operations—Responding to New
Realities”, during which Secretary-General António Guterres briefed council
members on plans to conduct extensive consultations as part of the
comprehensive review of UN peace operations as requested by the September 2024
The Pact of the Future.
On 29 July, Pakistan
convened a briefing on “Adapting Peace operations for the pursuit of political
solutions – priorities and challenges”. The ROK is also expected to convene a
meeting on peacekeeping during its Council Presidency in September.
The trio appears to be
moving towards proposing a council product before the end of the year.
The unanimous adoption of
resolution 2788 on 22 July was one notable early achievement in the second half
of 2025. Initiated by Pakistan, it represents a recommitment by the council to
the peaceful settlement of disputes, highlighting some of the key Chapter VI
tools available to the body in a complex and challenging multilateral
environment and requesting the Secretary-General to provide concrete
recommendations in a briefing to the Council on strengthening the mechanisms
for the peaceful settlement of disputes one year after the resolution’s
adoption.
The resolution builds on
the commitment of world leaders and heads of state in Action 16 of The Pact for
the Future—which outlines member states’ vision of the future of
multilateralism—to “promote cooperation and understanding between member
states, defuse tensions, seek to pacific settlement of disputes and resolve
conflicts”.
There are several
uncertainties facing the Security Council for the rest of 2025. Significant
budget cuts to areas relevant to the council’s work—such as peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations—are most likely forthcoming as part of the UN80
initiative. There could be deeper cuts
depending on the size of anticipated funding reductions to the UN in the US
federal budget for fiscal year 2026 (1 October 2025 to 30 September 2026).
Diminished resources–along with US concerns about the effectiveness of UN peace
operations—could necessitate major adjustments to the size and scope of
activities that the Council mandates and oversees and may have an impact on the
review of UN peace operations that is expected to be finalised in 2026.
There is no shortage of
crises to occupy the council’s attention in the second half of 2025. It will likely continue to devote significant
attention to Ukraine and Gaza, although any significant movement on these
crises will likely take place as a result of negotiations outside the council.
Yemen and Lebanon will probably continue to be affected by the ripple effects
of the war between Hamas and Israel.
Its approach to Iran’s
nuclear issues requires careful consideration, following the setbacks to the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran, including US withdrawal in
2018 and Iran’s non-compliance, and the recent strikes on the country’s nuclear
facilities by Israel and the US. Resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015, which
endorsed the JCPOA on Iran, expires on 18 October.
Facing these and other
difficult issues, a divided council will need to find ways to build trust and
cooperate to maximise its effectiveness in difficult fiscal circumstances and a
fluid international peace and security environment. If it does not, there is a
danger that the council will become increasingly sidelined, and some issues
related to the maintenance of international peace and security will move
outside of the council.
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